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NONCOOPERATIVE OLIGOPOLY IN ECONOMIES WITH
INFINITELY MANY COMMODITIES AND TRADERS
Sayantan Ghosal1 and Simone Tonin2
In this paper, we extend the noncooperative analysis of multilateral
oligopoly to exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and
trader types where exchange is modelled using a strategic market game
with commodity money and trading posts. We prove the existence of
an “active” Cournot-Nash equilibrium and its convergence to a Walras
equilibrium when the economy is replicated.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In a multilateral oligopoly model, each trader owns the numeraire good and only one
other commodity. Shubik (1973) opened the lined of research on strategic market games
by analysing noncooperative exchange in the multilateral oligopoly model. Subsequent re-
search on noncooperative oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting, following Shubik (1973),
continues to focus on economies with a finite number of commodities. In this paper, in
a multilateral oligopoly strategic market game with commodity money and trading posts
(Dubey and Shubik (1978)), we extend the analysis of noncooperative oligopoly to exchange
economies with a countably infinite number of commodities and trader types.
The model analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) belongs to the line of research initiated
by the seminal papers of Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976), and Shapley and Shubik (1977).
In this class of models there is a trading post for each commodity where that commodity
is exchanged for commodity money. The actions available to a trader are bids, amounts
of commodity money given in exchange for other commodities, and offers, amounts of the
commodities in trader’s initial endowment put up in exchange for commodity money. Prices
are determined as ratios between the sum of bids and the sum of offers in each trading
post and, if the latter quantity is zero, the price is set equal to zero. Dubey and Shapley
(1994) and Codognato and Ghosal (2000) extended strategic market games to exchange
economies with a finite number of commodities and a continuum of traders. To the best of
our knowledge, no previous attempt has been made to extend such models to economies
with an infinity of commodities and traders. In contrast, the cooperative game theoretic
approach to modelling oligopoly in exchange economies was extended to economies with
a continuum of commodities, by Gabszewicz (1968), and to economies with a countable
infinity of commodities by Peleg and Yaari (1970).
Our contributions are as follows. We begin by specifying a well-defined exchange econ-
omy with a countable infinity of commodities and trader types with the structure of a
multilateral oligopoly. Our approach relies on the literature on economies with infinitely
many commodities and with a double infinity of commodities and traders considered by
Bewley (1972) and Wilson (1981) respectively. Next, we reformulate the strategic market
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game analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) and study the classical problems of existence
of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and convergence to a Walras equilibrium, as the previous
contributions in this literature (see also Amir, Sahi, Shubik, and Yao (1990), and Sahi and
Yao (1989)).
In a strategic market game, given the price formation and allocation rules, it is straight-
forward to note that a “trivial” Cournot-Nash equilibrium at which there is no trade and
all prices are zero always exists. For this reason, Dubey and Shubik (1978) proved the exis-
tence of an “equilibrium point” at which the prices are positive. Subsequently, Cordella and
Gabszewicz (1998) showed that it is possible to have an equilibrium point without trade
and Busetto and Codognato (2006) found that the role of the positive prices at an equilib-
rium point without trade is unclear.1 We address this issue in our setting by adapting the
analysis of Bloch and Ferrer (2001) (carried out for the case of a bilateral oligopoly), and
we prove the existence of an “active” Cournot-Nash equilibrium at which all commodities
are exchanged. Our existence result requires us to solve new technical problems as, in our
analysis, the dimension of the commodity space is countably infinite. In addition to the
classical assumptions on initial endowments and utility functions (Assumptions 1–4), we
impose stronger restrictions on the marginal rate of substitution between the commodity
in the trader’s initial endowment and commodity money (Assumption 5) which allow us
to derive uniform lower and upper bounds on prices, a key step to prove the existence
theorem. To obtain this fundamental result, we could not follow the proof strategy based
on the Uniform Monotonicity Lemma as in Dubey and Shubik (1978). We then develop
a new approach that uses the Generalised Kuhn-Tucker Theorem (see Luenberger (1969))
to characterise traders’ best responses. Further, our proof of the existence of an active
Cournot-Nash equilibrium relies on an additional assumption on traders’ marginal utilities
(Assumption 6, a generalisation of Bloch and Ferrer (2001)’s conditions to a framework
with more than two commodities). We clarify the role played by Assumption 6 in Example
1. It is worth noting that Assumption 6, differently from Assumption 5, would imply the ex-
istence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with trade in all trading posts even in a multilateral
oligopoly model with a finite number of commodities.
Under our assumptions the existence of a Walras equilibrium is a straightforward con-
sequence of the existence result in Wilson (1981). We show that an active Cournot-Nash
equilibrium converges to the Walras equilibrium, when the underlying exchange economy
is replicated. Our proof follows the strategy adopted by Dubey and Shubik (1978).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the exchange
economy and the strategic market game. In Section 3 we prove the theorem of existence
of an active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We also provide an example of an
economy satisfying all the assumptions we made. In Section 4 we show that the existence
of a Walras equilibrium follows from Wilson (1981). In Section 5 we prove the convergence
theorem. In Section 6 we discuss our results and we draw some conclusions.
2. THE MODEL
In this section, we specify a multilateral oligopoly model with a countable infinity of
commodities and traders and the strategic market game associated to it. We formally state
1The formal definition of equilibrium point can be found in Dubey and Shubik (1978). Shapley (1976)
introduced the notion of “virtual prices” to provide an economic rationale to the positive price associated to
a trading post without trade. The proof of existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium having positive virtual
prices for the commodities which are not exchanged is an open problem. See Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998)
and Busetto and Codognato (2006) for a more detailed analysis.
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and discuss the assumptions required to prove the existence of a Walras equilibrium and a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium where all commodities are exchanged.
Let Tt be the set of traders of type t and let k ≥ 2 be the cardinality of each set Tt,
for t = 1, 2, . . . . The set of traders I = ∪∞t=1Tt is the union of all sets of types of trader.
The set of commodities is J = {0, 1, 2, . . . } and the consumption set is denoted by X.
An element of the set X is a commodity bundle x and the coordinate xj represents the
amount of commodity j in the commodity bundle x. A trader i is characterised by an initial
endowment, wi, and a utility function, ui : X → R, which describes his preferences. Traders
of the same type have the same initial endowment and utility function. The context should
clarify whether the superscript refers to a trader type or to a trader. An exchange economy
is a set kE = {(ui(·), wi) : i ∈ I} and the subscript k denotes the number of traders of each
type. Let wj =
∑∞
t=1w
t
j and w be the vector whose coordinates are wj , for each j ∈ J . In an
exchange economy kE the vector of aggregate initial endowment is then kw. An allocation
x is a specification of a commodity bundle xi, for each i ∈ I, such that ∑i∈I xij = kwj , for
each j ∈ J . Let p be a price vector whose coordinate pj is the price of commodity j, for
each j ∈ J . The budget set of trader i is Bi(p) = {x ∈ X : ∑∞j=0 pjxj ≤ ∑∞j=0 pjwij}, for
any p. A Walras equilibrium is a pair (p,x) consisting of a price vector p and an allocation
x such that xi is maximal with respect to ui(·) in i’s budget set Bi(p), for each i ∈ I.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The consumption set X is the space of non-negative bounded sequences
`+∞ and it is endowed with the product topology.2
Assumption 2 The vector w belongs to `+∞.
Assumption 3 The initial endowment of a type t trader is such that wt0 > 0, w
t
t ≥ W ,
with W a positive constant, and wtj = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
Assumption 4 The utility function of a type t trader is continuous, continuously Fre´chet
differentiable, monotone and strongly monotone with respect to commodity money, and
concave, for t = 1, 2, . . . .3
Before to state the next assumptions on utility functions, we need some further definitions
introduced by Aumann (1975). Let E be a subset of an Euclidean space. A function f i :
E → R is positive on the set E if there is a positive constant c such that f i(x) > c, for each
x ∈ E. A function f i : E → R is bounded on the set E if there is a positive constant d such
that f i(x) < d, for each x ∈ E. Consider now a sequence of functions {f i(·)}i such that
f i : E → R, for each i. A sequence of functions {f i(·)}i is uniformly positive on the set E if
there is a positive constant c such that f i(x) > c, for each x ∈ E, for each i. A sequence of
functions {f i(·)}i is uniformly bounded on the set E if there is a positive constant d such
that f i(x) < d, for each x ∈ E, for each i.
Assumption 5 The utility function of a type t trader satisfies the following conditions
(i) ut(x) = vt(x0, xt) + z
t(x1, . . . , xt−1, xt+1, . . . ), for t = 1, 2, . . . ;
(ii) the marginal rate of substitution ∂v
t
∂xt
(x0, w
t
t)
/
∂vt
∂x0
(x0, w
t
t) < 1, for each x0 ∈ [0, wt0],
for t = 1, 2, . . . ;
2All relevant mathematical definitions and results can be found in the mathematical appendix.
3Differentiability should be implicitly understood to include the case of infinite partial derivatives along
the boundary of the consumption set (for a discussion of this case, see Kreps (2012), p. 58). Strongly
monotone with respect to commodity money means that if there are two commodity bundles x and y such
that xj ≥ yj , for each j ∈ J \ {0}, and x0 > y0, then ut(x) > ut(y).
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(iii) the sequence of marginal rates of substitution { ∂vt∂xt (x0, xt)
/
∂vt
∂x0
(x0, xt)}t is uniformly
positive and uniformly bounded on the set [0, 1 + supj wj ]× [0, 1 + supj wj ];
Assumption 6 There exists two types of trader r and t having the following utility
functions
ur(x) = vr(x0, xr) +
∑
j 6=0,r
αjzrj (xj),
ut(x) = vt(x0, xt) +
∑
j 6=0,t
βjztj(xj),
with α, β ∈ (0, 1). The functions vr(·) and vt(·) are such that ∂vr∂x0 (x0, xr) and ∂v
t
∂x0
(x0, xt)
are bounded on the set [0, 1 + supj wj ]× [0, 1 + supj wj ]. The functions zrj (·) and ztj(·) are
such that limxj→0
∂zrj
∂xj
(xj) =∞, for each j ∈ J \ {0, r}, and limxj→0
∂ztj
∂xj
(xj) =∞, for each
j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
Assumption 1 imposes conditions on the consumption set which are standard in the
literature on infinite economies (see Bewley (1972) and Wilson (1981)). Assumptions 2 and
3 are restrictions on initial endowments. Assumption 2 implies that the vector of aggregate
initial endowment has an upper bound. Assumption 3 formalises the notion of multilateral
oligopoly and implies that the vector of aggregate initial endowment has also a positive lower
bound. Assumption 4 specifies classical restrictions on traders’ utility functions. Assumption
5 specifies stronger restrictions on traders’ utility functions. In order to make the restrictions
on marginal rates of substitution clearer and more transparent, for each trader type t the
set of commodities is assumed to be partitioned in two subsets: one subset consisting of
commodity money and the commodity owned by the trader and another subset consisting
of all other commodities. Assumption 5(i) requires that the utility function is additively
separable across the two subsets in the partition. Assumption 5(ii) implies that, in a subset
of the consumption set, the marginal utility of commodity money is strictly greater that
the marginal utility of the other commodity held by the trader. Assumption 5(iii) applies
the notions of uniformly positive and uniformly bounded sequence of functions, introduced
by Aumann (1975), on the marginal rate of substitution between the commodity in the
trader’s initial endowment and commodity money. A similar restriction on marginal rates
of substitution was imposed, for the first time, by Khan and Vohra (1988) (see also Anderson
and Zame (1998), Donnini and Graziano (2009)). Note that, for each type of trader t, the
set [0, 1+supj wj ]× [0, 1+supj wj ] contains all the quantities of commodities xt0 and xtt that
are feasible at a type-symmetric allocation, where all traders of the same type have the same
commodity bundle.4 These stronger assumptions are essential to prove that price vectors
are uniformly bounded away from zero and from above at any Cournot-Nash equilibria, a
fundamental result in the literature on strategic market games. It is worth noting that all
the stronger assumptions are made on the function vt(·) while the function zt(·) just needs
to satisfy the classical restrictions on utility functions. Finally, Assumption 6 is required
to show that all commodities are exchanged at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Dubey and
Shubik (1978) do not make such an assumption because their existence theorem allows for
Cournot-Nash equilibria at which some commodities are not exchanged: a further discussion
follows in the next section. Finally, we point out that the requirements that the marginal
utility of commodity money is bounded for the types of trader satisfying Assumption 6 is
4We add 1 to supj wj because in the perturbed strategic market game (defined in Section 3) the total
amount of a commodity may be larger that supj wj .
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consistent with the restrictions imposed in Assumptions 5(ii) and 5(iii) (a point clarified in
Example 2 below).
We now introduce the strategic market game kΓ associated with the exchange economy,
with k the number of traders of each type.5 In this game, each trader has two types of
actions: the offer of the commodity in the initial endowment and the bids of commodity
money on all other commodities. So, the strategy set of a trader i of type t is
Si =
{
si = (qit, b
i
1, . . . , b
i
t−1, b
i
t+1, . . . ) : 0 ≤ qit ≤ wit, bij ≥ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t},
and
∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0
}
,
where qit is the offer of commodity t that trader i puts up in exchange for commodity
money and bij is the bid of commodity money that he makes on commodity j. Without loss
of generality, we make the following technical assumption on the strategy set.
Assumption 7 The set Si belongs to `+∞ endowed with the product topology, for each
i ∈ I.
This assumption implies that Si lies in a normed space and therefore in a Hausdorff space.
Let S =
∏
i∈I S
i and S−r =
∏
i∈I\{r} S
i. Let s and s−i be elements of S and S−i respectively.
In the game, there is a trading post for each commodity where its price is determined
and the commodity is exchanged for commodity money. For each s ∈ S, the price vector
p(s) is such that
pj(s) =
{
b¯j
q¯j
if q¯j 6= 0
0 if q¯j = 0
,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with q¯j =
∑
i∈Tj q
i
j and b¯j =
∑
i∈I\Tj b
i
j . By Assumption 2, the sums
q¯j and b¯j are uniformly bounded from above. For each s ∈ S, the final holding xi(s) of a
trader i of type t is such that
xi0(s) = w
i
0 −
∑
j 6=0,t
bij + q
i
tpt(s), (1)
xit(s) = w
i
t − qit, (2)
xij(s) =
{
bij
pj(s)
if pj(s) 6= 0
0 if pj(s) = 0
, (3)
for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
The payoff function of a trader i, pii : S → R, is such that pii(s) = ui(xi(s)).
We now introduce the definitions of a best response correspondence and a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 1 The best response correspondence of a trader i is a correspondence φi :
S−i → Si such that
φi(s−i) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
: pii(si, s−i),
for each s−i ∈ S−i.
5Our game extends the model of Shubik (1973) to an infinite dimensional commodity space. The game
defined by Dubey and Shubik (1978) differs from ours and Shubik (1973) as in the former traders may bid
on all trading posts (including the trading post where the commodity owned by the trader is offered).
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Definition 2 An sˆ ∈ S is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of kΓ if sˆi ∈ φi(sˆ−i), for each
i ∈ I.
Finally, we call type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
in which all traders of the same type play the same strategy and active Cournot-Nash
equilibrium a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which q¯j > 0 and b¯j > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
3. EXISTENCE OF AN ACTIVE COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we provide an example which clarifies the role of Assumption 6 (Example
1), we state and prove the theorem of existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and
we show an exchange economy which satisfies Assumptions 1–7 (Example 2).
The overall structure of our existence proof is similar to the one developed in the previous
literature on strategic market games (see Dubey and Shubik (1978), Amir et al. (1990), Sahi
and Yao (1989)). This consists in proving the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a
perturbed strategic market game and then in showing that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of the game kΓ is the limit of the sequence of perturbed Cournot-Nash equilibria. This
approach relies on the fact that payoff functions are continuous at the limit, so that it is
crucial to prove that prices are uniformly bounded away from zero and from above along the
sequence of perturbed equilibria (Lemma 3). Dubey and Shubik (1978) showed this result
by applying the Uniform Monotonicity Lemma but in our framework we cannot follow that
strategy even if such lemma can be proved in our infinite dimensional commodity space.
The problem is that prices’ lower bounds obtained in their paper depend on the number of
commodities and converge to zero in economies with our commodity space.6 For this reason
we develop a new proof, which is inspired by the one adopted in Amir et al. (1990), and it is
based on the fact that all commodities are put up in exchange for commodity money at any
perturbed Cournot-Nash equilibrium (Lemma 2). This result does not have any analogue in
the literature and it is based on the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem for infinite dimensional spaces
and on Assumption 5(ii). With this new technique we show that the lower and upper bounds
of a price pj depend on the type j trader’s marginal rate of substitution between commodity
j and commodity money. This is where the more restrictive Assumption 5(iii) is required.
Finally, Assumption 6 is needed to show that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of kΓ is active.
It is important to stress that our Theorem 1 is a strengthened version of the existence result
proposed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) because under their set of assumptions it is possible
to define exchange economies where the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium has no trade (see
Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998)). This is the reason why Dubey and Shubik (1978) requires
neither a condition similar to Assumption 6 nor differentiable utility functions. Differently,
Bloch and Ferrer (2001) proved the existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the
bilateral oligopoly model by making assumptions on the limiting behaviours of marginal
utilities comparable to the assumption made here.
The following example shows that an exchange economy satisfying Assumptions 1-5 and
7, but not Assumption 6, could have a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium with no trade.
Example 1 Consider an exchange economy with two traders of each type in which traders
of types 1, 2, r ≥ 3 odd, and t ≥ 4 even have the following utility functions and initial
6See the definition of the lower bound A at page 9 in Dubey and Shubik (1978).
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endowments
u1(x) =
2
3
x0 +
1
2
x1 + x2 w
1 = (2, 2, 0, . . . ),
u2(x) =
2
3
x0 + x1 +
1
2
x2 w
2 = (2, 0, 2, 0, . . . ),
ur(x) =
2
3
x0 +
1
2
xr + xr+1 w
r = (2−r, 0, . . . , 0, 2, 0, . . . ),
ut(x) =
2
3
x0 + xt−1 +
1
2
xt w
t = (2−t, 0, . . . , 0, 2, 0, . . . ).
This exchange economy satisfies Assumptions 1–5 and the strategy sets of the strategic
market game satisfy Assumption 7. Moreover, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the
game 2Γ associated to the exchange economy has no trade.
Proof: Assumptions 1 and 7 are restrictions on the consumption set and the strategy sets
which are satisfied by construction. Since w0 =
17
4 and wj = 2, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, w has
a upper bound and then w ∈ `+∞. Hence, Assumption 2 is satisfied. Moreover, since wt0 > 0,
wtt = 2, and w
t
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, for t = 1, 2, . . . , Assumption 3 is satisfied. Since
each utility function is linear and it depends only on the quantities of three commodities, As-
sumption 4 is satisfied. Moreover, since vr(x0, xr) =
2
3x0 +
1
2xr, z
r(x1, . . . , xr−1, xr+1 . . . ) =
xr+1, for each r odd, and v
t(x0, xt) =
2
3x0 +
1
2xt, z
t(x1, . . . , xt−1, xt+1 . . . ) = xt−1, for each t
even, Assumption 5(i) is satisfied. Finally, since ∂v
t
∂xt
(x0, xt)
/
∂vt
∂x0
(x0, xt) =
3
4 , for each x ∈ X,
for t = 1, 2, . . . , Assumptions 5(ii) and 5(iii) are satisfied.
We now show that there exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium at which there is
no trade. First, it is straightforward to verify that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium must be
type-symmetric. For this reason, in the rest of the proof superscripts refer to trader types.
It is important to keep in mind that there are two traders for each type. We now proceed
by contradiction. Consider, without loss of generality, the trading post for commodity 1.
Suppose that ¯ˆq1 = 2qˆ
1
1 > 0 and
¯ˆ
b1 = 2bˆ
2
1 > 0. Then, by the necessary conditions of the
Generalised Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, we have that
∂pi1
∂q11
(sˆ) =
2
3
¯ˆ
b1 ¯ˆq1 − ¯ˆb1qˆ11(
¯ˆq1
)2 − 12 ≥ 0 and ∂pi2∂b21 (sˆ) = −23 +
¯ˆ
b1 ¯ˆq1 − bˆ21 ¯ˆq1(¯ˆ
b1
)2 ≥ 0.
Since the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is type-symmetric, the inequalities above become
bˆ21
qˆ11
≥ 3
2
and
bˆ21
qˆ11
≤ 3
4
,
a contradiction. Hence, ¯ˆq1 = 0 and
¯ˆ
b1 = 0. Since this contradiction arises for each com-
modity, we can conclude that at the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium there is no trade.
Q.E.D.
This example clarifies that the existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium relies
crucially on the fact that for each commodity j there exists a type of trader t such that
limxj→0
∂ut
∂xj
(xj) = ∞. Therefore, Assumption 6 can be replaced by another assumption
as long as it requires this condition to be satisfied. We now state and prove the existence
theorem.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1–7, there exists an active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium for kΓ.
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Following Dubey and Shubik (1978), in order to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, we introduce the perturbed strategic market game kΓ
, the set Y i(s−i, ), and
the function xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ).
7 The perturbed strategic market game kΓ
 is a game defined
as kΓ with the only exception that the price vector p(s) becomes
pj(s) =
b¯j + 
q¯j + 
,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with  ∈ (0, 1]. The interpretation is that an outside agency places a
fixed bid of  and a fixed offer of  in each trading post. This does not change the traders’
strategy sets, but does affect the prices, the final holdings, and the payoffs. Consider,
without loss of generality, a trader i of type t and let
Y i(s−i, ) =
{
(xi1, x
i
2, . . . ) ∈ `+∞ : xit = wit − qit, xij = bij
q¯j + 
b¯ij + b
i
j + 
, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t},
for each si ∈ Si
}
,
for each s−i ∈ S−i and  ∈ (0, 1], and let
xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ) = w
i
0 +
∑
j 6=0,t
(b¯ij + )x
i
j
xij − q¯j − 
+
(b¯t + )(w
i
t − xit)
q¯it + + w
i
t − xit
, (4)
with q¯it = q¯t − qit and b¯ij = b¯j − bij . The function xi0(xi1, xi2, . . . ) can be easily obtained
by the function xi0(s) in (1) by relabelling the variables. The set Y
i(s−i, ) contains all
the commodity bundles (xi1, x
i
2, . . . ) that are feasible final holdings for the trader i in the
perturbed strategic market game, for any given s−i ∈ S−i and  ∈ (0, 1]. It is worth noting
that the quantity of commodity money is not included in the commodity bundles belonging
to Y i(s−i, ). Before we start with the proof of existence, we prove two preliminary results
on Y i(s−i, ) and xi0(xi1, xi2, . . . ) which are used in Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 The set Y i(s−i, ) is convex, for each i ∈ I.
Proof: Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t and fix the strategies
s−i for all other traders. Take two commodity bundles x′i, x′′i ∈ Y i(s−i, ) and consider
x∗i = λx′i + (1 − λ)x′′i.8 We want to show that x∗i ∈ Y i(s−i, ). Then, there must exist a
strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that xi(s∗i, s−i) = x∗i. Let x′i = xi(s′i, s−i) and x′′i = xi(s′′i, s−i).
Consider first the commodity t. Since the function in (2) is linear in qit, we have that
x∗it = xit(λq′it + (1− λ)q′′it , s−i) = xit(q∗it , s−i).9 Consider now a commodity j 6= t. Since the
function in (3) is concave in bij , we obtain that
x∗ij = λx
′i
j + (1− λ)x′′ij = λxij(b′ij , s−i) + (1− λ)xij(b′′ij , s−i) ≤ xij(λb′ij + (1− λ)b′′ij , s−i).
By the Intermediate Value Theorem and since xij(λb
′i
j + (1 − λ)b′′ij , s−i) = 0 by setting
b′ij = 0 and b
′′i
j = 0, we may reduce b
′i
j and b
′′i
j appropriately to get x
∗i
j . Then, there exists
b∗ij such that x
∗i
j = x
i
j(b
∗i
j , s
−i), for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. Hence, there exists a s∗i ∈ Si such
that x∗i = xi(s∗i, s−i) and then x∗i ∈ Y i(s−i, ). Q.E.D.
7Dubey and Shubik (1978) denotes the set Y i(s−i, ) with Di(Q,B, ). In order to save in notation, with
some abuse, we denote by xi0(·) both the function xi0(s) and the function xi0(xi1, xi2, . . . ).
8It is important to keep in mind that these commodity bundles do not include the quantity of commodity
money.
9To clarify the exposition, in this proof we write xit(q
i
t, s
−i) and xij(b
i
j , s
−i) instead of xit(s
i, s−i) and
xij(s
i, s−i), for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
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Proposition 2 The function xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ) is strictly concave on the set Y
i(s−i, ), for
each i ∈ I.
Proof: Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t and fix the strategies s−i
for all other traders. It is straightforward to verify that each term of the summation in (4)
is a strictly concave function, i.e.,
(b¯ij+)x
i
j
xij−q¯j−
is strictly concave in xij , for each x
i
j ∈ [0, q¯j ], for
each j ∈ J \{0, t}, and (b¯t+)(wit−xit)
q¯it++w
i
t−xit
is strictly concave in xit, for each x
i
t ∈ [0, wit]. Since each
term of the summation is a strictly concave function, we obtain the following inequality
xi0(λx
′i
1 + (1− λ)x′′i1 , λx′i2 + (1− λ)x′′i2 , . . . ) = wi0 +
∑
j 6=0,t
(b¯ij + )(λx
′i
j + (1− λ)x′′ij )
(λx′ij + (1− λ)x′′ij )− q¯j − 
+
(b¯t + )(w
i
t − (λx′it + (1− λ)x′′it ))
q¯it + + w
i
t − (λx′it + (1− λ)x′′it )
> wi0 +
∑
j 6=0,t
(
λ
(b¯ij + )x
′i
j
x′ij − q¯j − 
+ (1− λ) (b¯
i
j + )x
′′i
j
x′′ij − q¯j − 
)
+
λ
(b¯t + )(w
i
t − x′it )
q¯it + + w
i
t − x′it
+ (1− λ)(b¯t + )(w
i
t − x′′it )
q¯it + + w
i
t − x′′it
= λxi0(x
′i
1 , x
′i
2 , . . . ) + (1− λ)xi0(x′′i1 , x′′i2 , . . . ).
But then, xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ) is strictly concave on the set Y
i(s−i, ). Q.E.D.
In the next lemma we prove that there exists a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium in the perturbed strategic market game by using a fixed point theorem for infinite
dimensional spaces.
Lemma 1 There exists a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of kΓ
, for each  ∈
(0, 1].
Proof: Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i and fix the strategies s−i for all
other traders. In the perturbed game the payoff function pii(·) is continuous because it is a
composition of continuous functions (see Theorem 17.23, p. 566 in Aliprantis and Border
(2006), AB hereafter). The definition of the strategy set Si and Assumptions 2, 3, and 7
imply that Si is a non-empty and compact set. The compactness follows straightforwardly
by the Tychonoff Theorem (see Theorem 2.61, p. 52 in AB). Then, there exists a strategy
in Si that maximises the payoff function pii(·) by the Weierstrass Theorem (see Corollary
2.35, p. 40 in AB). Hence, the best response correspondence φi : S−i → Si is non-empty.
Moreover, since Si belongs to a Hausdorff space by Assumption 7, the correspondence
φi(·) is upper hemicontinuous by the Berge Maximum Theorem (see Theorem 17.31, p. 570
in AB). We now refine this result by showing that φi(·) is actually a continuous function.
Suppose that there are two strategies s′i and s′′i such that the final holdings xi(s′i, s−i) = x′i
and xi(s′′i, s−i) = x′′i maximise the payoff function. Consider the commodity bundle x∗i =
1
2x
′i+ 12x
′′i. Since the utility function is concave, we have that ui(x∗i) ≥ 12ui(x′i)+ 12ui(x′′i) =
ui(x′i). Since Y i(s−i, ) is convex, by Proposition 1, and xi0(xi1, xi2, . . . ) is strictly concave,
by Proposition 2, there exists a γ > 0 such that the commodity bundle x∗i+γe0 is a feasible
final holding. That is, there exists a strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that x∗i + γe0 = xi(s∗i, s−i).10
Then, as the utility function is strongly monotone with respect to xi0 by Assumption 4, we
obtain that ui(x∗i + γe0) > ui(x′i), a contradiction. But then, there is only one strategy
that maximises the payoff function and φi(·) is a single-valued best response correspondence.
Hence, φi(·) is a continuous function (see Lemma 17.6, p. 559 in AB), for each i ∈ I. As
we are looking for a fixed point in the strategy space S, let us consider S as the domain
10ej is an infinite vector in `∞ whose jth component is 1 and all others are 0.
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of the best response function, i.e., φi : S → Si. We then define a function Φ : S → S
such that Φ(s) =
∏
i∈I φ
i(s). The function Φ(·) is continuous since it is a product of
continuous functions (see Theorem 17.28, p. 568 in AB). Moreover, the strategy space
S belongs to a Hausdorff space and it is a non-empty, compact, and convex set as it is
a product of non-empty, compact, and convex sets. As above, compactness follows by the
Tychonoff Theorem. Then, the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff Theorem (see Corollary 17.56,
p. 583 in AB) implies that there exists a fixed point sˆ of Φ(·), which is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of the perturbed game kΓ
. We refine this result by showing that there exists
a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Let kS be the set of type-symmetric strategy
profiles in S. It is immediate to verify that kS is a non-empty, compact, and convex set
in a Hausdorff space. If Φ(·) is defined over the domain kS, Φ : kS → S, Φ(·) is still a
continuous function. Furthermore, in a type-symmetric situation traders of the same type
face the same optimisation problem and then Φ(s) ∈ kS, for each s ∈ kS. Then, there exists
a fixed point sˆ of Φ : kS → S, by the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff Theorem, and sˆ ∈ kS.
Hence, sˆ is a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game kΓ
.Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 shows that all commodities are put up in exchange for commodity money at a
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. The proof is based on the
Generalised Kuhn-Tucker Theorem and it requires Assumption 5(ii). Previous contributions
on strategic market games in finite economies do not need this result to prove the existence.
Lemma 2 At any type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game,
¯ˆqj > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
Proof: Let sˆ be a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game.
Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t. Since sˆi belongs to a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, it solves the following maximisation problem
max
si
pii(si, sˆ−i),
subject to qit ≤ wit, (i)∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0, (ii)
− qit ≤ 0, (iii)
− bij ≤ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. (iv)
(5)
The constraints can be written as a function g : `∞ → Z, with Z ⊂ `∞. It is straightforward
to verify that Z contains a closed positive cone with a non-empty interior and g(·) is Fre´chet
differentiable. We now show that there exists an h ∈ `∞ such that
g(sˆi) + g′(sˆi)h < 0,
with g′(·) the Fre´chet derivative of g(·). That is, we prove that sˆi is a regular point of the
constrained set.11 Given the constraints in (5), the inequality above can be written as the
11The notion of regular point, rigorously defined in the mathematical appendix, is a type of constraint
qualification (see Exercise 3 of Chapter 9 in Luenberger (1969)) and it does not correspond to the classical
Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualification (see Exercise 7 of Chapter 9 in Luenberger (1969)).
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following vector inequality
qˆit − wit∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j − wi0
−qˆit
−bˆi1
−bˆi2
. . .

+

ht∑
j 6=0,t hj
−ht
−h1
−h2
. . .

<

0
0
0
0
0
. . .

. (6)
First, suppose that the constraints (i) and (ii) are not binding. Consider a vector h with ht
positive and sufficiently small, hj positive and sufficiently small, for each j such that bˆ
i
j = 0,
and hj = 0, for each j such that bˆ
i
j > 0. Then, the vector inequality (6) is satisfied and sˆ
i
is a regular point. Now, suppose that the constraints (i) and (ii) are binding. Consider a
vector h with ht negative and sufficiently small, hj negative and sufficiently small, for each
j such that bˆij > 0, and hj positive and sufficiently small, for each j such that bˆ
i
j = 0. Then,
the vector inequality (6) is satisfied and sˆi is a regular point. If either constraint (i) or (ii)
is binding, the previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to the same result. Hence, sˆi is a
regular point of the constrained set. Finally, since we consider a perturbed strategic market
game and the utility function is Fre´chet differentiable by Assumption 4, the payoff function
pii(·) is Fre´chet differentiable as it is a composition of Fre´chet differentiable functions. We
have then proved that all the hypothesis of the Generalised Kuhn-Tucker Theorem are
satisfied (see the mathematical appendix). Therefore, there exist non-negative multipliers
λˆi1 and µˆ
i
t such that
∂pii
∂qit
(sˆi, sˆ−i)− λˆi1 + µˆit = 0, (7)
λˆi1(qˆ
i
t − wit) = 0,
µˆitqˆ
i
t = 0.
By the payoff function definition and Assumption 5(i), equation (7) can be written as
∂vi
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
t(sˆ))
¯ˆ
bt + 
¯ˆqt + 
(
1− qˆ
i
t
¯ˆqt + 
)
− ∂v
i
∂xt
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
t(sˆ))− λˆi1 + µˆit = 0. (8)
We now proceed by contradiction and we suppose that ¯ˆqt = 0. Then, qˆ
i
t = 0 which implies
that xit(sˆ) = w
i
t, by equation (2), and λˆ
i
1 = 0, by the complementary slackness conditions
as the constraint (i) is not binding. But then, the previous equation becomes
∂vi
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ), w
i
t)
¯ˆ
bt + 

− ∂v
i
∂xt
(xi0(sˆ), w
i
t) + µˆ
i
t = 0,
with xi0(sˆ) ∈ [0, wi0], by equation (1). Since
¯ˆ
bt+
 ≥ 1 and ∂v
i
∂xt
(x0, w
i
t) <
∂vi
∂x0
(x0, w
i
t) for each
x0 ∈ [0, wi0], by Assumption 5(ii), the left hand side of the equation is greater than zero, a
contradiction. Hence, ¯ˆqt > 0. We can then conclude that ¯ˆqj > 0, for each j ∈ J \{0}.Q.E.D.
We now show that price vectors at type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria have a uni-
form positive lower bound and a uniform upper bound independent of  and k. Since the
number of commodities is infinite, we cannot apply the same approach adopted by Dubey
and Shubik (1978). To prove the next lemma is essential Assumption 5(iii) and the result
obtained in Lemma 2.
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Lemma 3 For any type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game,
there exist two positive constants C and D, independent of  and k, such that
C < pj(sˆ) < D,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
Proof: For a trader of type t, it is immediate to verify that (xt0(sˆ), x
t
t(sˆ)) ∈ [0, 1 +
supj wj ] × [0, 1 + supj wj ], at any type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the per-
turbed strategic market game, for t = 1, 2, . . . , i.e., the set above contains all the quantities
of the commodities 0 and t which can be obtained at a final holding of a type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since the sequence { ∂vt∂xt (x0, xt)
/
∂vt
∂x0
(x0, xt)}t is uniformly pos-
itive and uniformly bounded on the set [0, 1 + supj wj ] × [0, 1 + supj wj ] by Assumption
5(iii), there exist two positive constants C ′ and D′, independent of  and k, such that
C ′ <
∂vt
∂xt
(xt0(sˆ), x
t
t(sˆ))
/
∂vt
∂x0
(xt0(sˆ), x
t
l(sˆ)) < D
′, (9)
for any type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ, for each type of trader t = 1, 2, . . . .
Consider now, without loss of generality, a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of
kΓ
. We first establish the existence of C. By Lemma 2, there exists a trader i of type l
such that qˆil > 0. Then, a decrease γ in i’s offer of commodity l is feasible, with 0 < γ ≤ qˆil ,
and has the following incremental effects on the final holding of trader i
xi0(sˆ(γ))− xi0(sˆ) = (qˆil − γ)
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + − γ
− qˆil
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + 
,
=
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + 
(
(qˆil − γ)
¯ˆql + 
¯ˆql + − γ
− qˆil
)
≥ −pl (sˆ)γ,
xil(sˆ(γ))− xil(sˆ) = γ,
xij(sˆ(γ))− xij(sˆ) = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, l}.
The inequality in the preceding array follows from the fact that ¯ˆql +  > ¯ˆql + − γ. Then,
we obtain the following vector inequality
xi(sˆ(γ)) ≥ xi(sˆ)− pl (sˆ)γe0 + γel.
By using a linear approximation of the utility function around the point xi(sˆ), we obtain
ui(xi(sˆ(γ)))− ui(xi(sˆ)) ≥ − ∂v
i
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
l(sˆ))p

l (sˆ)γ +
∂vi
∂xl
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
l(sˆ))γ +O(γ
2).
Since xi(sˆ) is an optimum point, the left hand side of the inequality is negative and then
pl (sˆ) >
∂vi
∂xl
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
l(sˆ))
/
∂vi
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
l(sˆ)).
By the inequalities in (9), we have that pl (sˆ) > C
′. We can then choose C = C ′ and conclude
that pj(sˆ) > C, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, for any type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ,
with C independent of  and k.
Now, we establish the existence of D. Since there are at least two traders of each type,
we consider a trader i of type l such that qˆil ≤
¯ˆql
2 . We need to consider two cases. First,
suppose that qˆil < w
i
l . Then, an increase γ in i’s offer of commodity l is feasible, with
12
0 < γ < min{wil − qˆil , }, and has the following incremental effects on the final holding of
trader i
xi0(sˆ(γ))− xi0(sˆ) = (qˆil + γ)
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + + γ
− qˆil
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + 
,
=
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + 
¯ˆqil + 
¯ˆqil + qˆ
i
l + + γ
γ ≥ 1
3
pl (sˆ)γ,
xil(sˆ(γ))− xil(sˆ) = −γ,
xij(sˆ(γ))− xij(sˆ) = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, l}.
The inequality in the preceding array follows from the fact that qˆil ≤ ¯ˆqil +  and γ ≤ ¯ˆqil + .
Then, we obtain the following vector inequality
xi(sˆ(γ)) ≥ xi(sˆ) + 1
3
pl (sˆ)γe0 − γel.
By using a linear approximation of the utility function around the point xi(sˆ), we obtain
ui(xi(sˆ(γ)))− ui(xi(sˆ)) ≥ ∂v
i
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
l(sˆ))
1
3
pl (sˆ)γ −
∂vi
∂xl
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
l(sˆ))γ +O(γ
2).
Since xi(sˆ) is an optimum point, the left hand side of the inequality is negative and then
pl (sˆ) < 3
(
∂vi
∂xl
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
l(sˆ))
/
∂vi
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ), x
i
l(sˆ))
)
.
By the inequalities in (9), we have that pl (sˆ) < 3D
′. Now, suppose that qˆil = w
i
l . Then,
pl (sˆ) ≤
kw0 + 1
kwil
<
w0 + 1
wil
<
supj wj + 1
W
= D′′.
The denominator of the first fraction is kwil because the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is type-
symmetric and the last inequality follows from the fact that w0 ≤ supj wj , by Assumption 2,
and wil ≥W , by Assumption 3. It is immediate to see that the constant D′′ is independent
of  and k. We can then choose D = max{3D′, D′′} and conclude that pj(sˆ) < D, for each
j ∈ J \ {0}, for any type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ, with D independent of 
and k. Q.E.D.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. Since we need to consider a sequence of Cournot-
Nash equilibria at different perturbed games, in the next proof, we write sˆn to denote a
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game kΓ
n and sˆ to denote the
limit of the sequence {sˆn}n.12
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider a sequence of {n}n converging to 0. By Lemma 1, in
each perturbed game there exists a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then, we
can consider a sequence of type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria {sˆn}n associated to the
sequence {n}n. As proved in Lemma 1, S is compact and, by Lemma 3, pnj (sˆn) ∈ [C,D],
which is a compact interval, for each j ∈ J \{0}. Then, we can pick a subsequence of {sˆhn}n
that converge to s such that s ∈ S and pj(s) ∈ [C,D], for each j ∈ J \ {0}, as the product
topology is the topology of coordinate-wise convergence. But then, the strategy profile s
is a point of continuity of payoff functions and then it is a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash
12To avoid cumbersome notation, in the proofs of Lemmas 1–3 we have not written sˆ even if the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium belongs to a game kΓ
.
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equilibrium of the game kΓ, i.e., sˆ. It remains to prove that sˆ is an active type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Consider a trader i of type t satisfying Assumption 6. We know
that the strategy sˆi,hn solves the maximization problem (5) as it belongs to a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, for each n. Since all the hypothesis of the Generalised Kuhn-Tucker Theorem
are satisfied, as proved in Lemma 2, there exist non-negative multipliers λˆ
i,hn
2 and µˆ
i,hn
j ,
for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, such that
∂pii
∂bij
(sˆi,hn , sˆ−i,hn )− λˆi,hn2 + µˆi,hnj = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, (10)
λˆ
i,hn
2
(∑
j 6=0,t
bˆ
i,hn
j − wi0
)
= 0,
µˆ
i,hn
j bˆ
i,hn
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
By the definition of the payoff function and Assumption 6, equation (10) can be written as
− ∂v
i
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ
hn ), xit(sˆ
hn )) + βj
∂zij
∂xj
(xij(sˆ
hn ))
1
p
hn
j (sˆ
hn )
(
1− bˆ
i,hn
j
¯ˆ
b
hn
j + hn
)
−λˆi,hn2 + µˆi,hnj = 0,
(11)
for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, for each n. We now proceed by contradiction. We first suppose that
the sequence of trader i’s sums of bids converges to zero, i.e., limn→∞
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i,hn
j = 0.
Then, there exists a natural number N such that
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i,hn
j < w
i
0, for each n ≥ N . Then,
λ
i,hn
1 = 0, for each n ≥ N by the complementary slackness condition. Consider, without
loss of generality, a commodity j. We have that 1 − bˆ
i,hn
j
¯ˆ
b
hn
j +hn
≥ 12 , as the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is type-symmetric and k ≥ 2, and 1
p
hn
j (sˆ
hn )
> 1D , by Lemma 3. Then, we can
derive the following inequality from the first order condition (11)
− ∂v
i
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ
hn ), xit(sˆ
hn )) + βj
∂zij
∂xj
(xij(sˆ
hn ))
1
D
1
2
+ µˆ
i,hn
j ≤ 0, (12)
which is satisfied at any Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆhn with n ≥ N . When n → ∞, we
have that bˆ
i,hn
j → 0, as
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i,hn
j → 0, and this implies that
∂zij
∂xj
(xij(sˆ
hn )) → ∞ as
limxj→0
∂zij
∂xj
(xj) = ∞, by Assumption 6. Since, the marginal utility ∂vi∂x0 (xi0(sˆhn ), xit(sˆhn ))
has an upper bound, as ∂v
i
∂x0
(x0, xt) is bounded on [0, 1 + supj wj ] × [0, 1 + supj wj ] by
Assumption 6, it follows that there exists a natural number N ′ such that the left hand
side of inequality (12) is positive at sˆhn , for each n ≥ N ′, a contradiction. Then, we can
conclude that the sequence of trader i’s sums of bids converges to a positive constant, i.e.,
limn→∞
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i,hn
j > 0. This result implies that there exists at least one commodity l such
that bˆil > 0. Since, 1−
bˆ
i,hn
l
¯ˆ
b
hn
l +hn
≤ 1, 1
p
hn
l (sˆ
hn )
< 1C , by Lemma 3, and
∂vi
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ
hn ), xit(sˆ
hn ))
has an upper bound, by Assumption 6, we can derive the following inequality from the first
order condition (11) with respect to commodity l
λˆ
i,hn
2 ≤ βl
∂zil
∂xl
(xil(sˆ
hn ))
1
C
+ µˆ
i,hn
l . (13)
Since limn→∞ bˆ
i,hn
l = bˆ
i
l > 0, there exists a natural number N
′′ such that bˆi,hnl > 0, for
each n ≥ N ′′. This implies that ∂zil∂xl (xil(sˆhn )) has a uniform upper bound, for each n ≥ N ′′,
14
as zij(·) is continuously Fre´chet differentiable by Assumption 4, and that µi,hnl = 0, for
each n ≥ N ′′, by the complementary slackness condition as constraint (iv) is not binding.
Then, limn→∞ λˆ
i,hn
2 < ∞. We proceed again by contradiction. Suppose that there exists
a commodity j 6= l, t such that bˆij = 0. By the same steps used above to obtain inequality
(12), we can obtain the following inequality for the commodity j such that bˆij = 0
− ∂v
i
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ
hn ), xit(sˆ
hn )) + βj
∂zij
∂xj
(xij(sˆ
hn ))
1
D
1
2
− λˆi,hn2 + µˆi,hnj ≤ 0, (14)
which is satisfied at any type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆhn , for each n. As
above, ∂v
i
∂x0
(xi0(sˆ
hn ), xit(sˆ
hn )) has an upper bound and, when n→∞, we have that ∂z
i
j
∂xj
(xij(sˆ
hn ))→
∞ as bˆi,hnj → 0. Then, it follows that limn→∞ λˆi,hn2 = ∞ because the left hand side of
inequality (14) must be negative. But, by inequality (13), we have that limn→∞ λˆ
i,hn
2 <∞,
a contradiction. Hence, we can conclude that bˆij > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. This implies
that
¯ˆ
bj > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. By considering a trader i of type r satisfying Assump-
tion 6, the previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to the same result for the bid on
commodity t, i.e.,
¯ˆ
bt > 0. Hence, we have that
¯ˆ
bj > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}. Moreover, this
result implies that also ¯ˆqj > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, because pj(sˆ) ∈ [C,D] and pj(sˆ) = b¯jq¯j ,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}. Therefore, sˆ is an active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
We now show an example where Assumptions 1–7 are satisfied.
Example 2 Consider an exchange economy with k traders of each type in which traders
of type 1, 2, 3, and t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x) =
2
3
x0 +
1
2
x1 +
∞∑
j=2
3−j lnxj w1 = (2, 2, 0, . . . ),
u2(x) =
2
3
x0 +
1
2
x2 + 3
−1 lnx1 +
∞∑
j=3
3−j lnxj w2 = (2, 0, 2, 0, . . . ),
u3(x) =
2
3
x0 +
1
2
x3 +
∞∑
j=4
3−j lnxj w3 = (2−3, 0, 0, 2, 0, . . . ),
ut(x) =
2
3
x0 +
1
2
xt +
∞∑
j=t+1
3−j lnxj wt = (2−t, 0, . . . , 0, 2, 0, . . . ).
This exchange economy satisfies Assumptions 1–6 and the strategy sets of the strategic
market game satisfy Assumption 7. Furthermore, the active type-symmetric active Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of the game kΓ associated to the exchange economy is(
qˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . .
)
=
(
2G(1)2
3
,
G(1)
6
,
G(2)
18
, . . . ,
G(j − 1)
3j−12
, . . .
)
,
(
qˆ22, bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . .
)
=
(
2G(1)2
9
,
G(1)
2
,
G(2)
18
, . . . ,
G(j − 1)
3j−12
, . . .
)
,
(
qˆ33, bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . .
)
=
(
2G(1)G(2)
27
, 0, 0,
G(3)
54
, . . . ,
G(j − 1)
3j−12
, . . .
)
,
(
qˆtt, bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, . . .
)
=
(
2G(1)G(t− 1)
3t
, 0, . . . , 0,
G(t)
3t2
, . . .
)
,
with G(y) =
(
1− 1yk
)
, for t = 4, 5, . . . .
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Proof: Assumptions 1 and 7 are satisfied by construction. As the initial endowments are
the same of Example 1, Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied. Each utility function is additively
separable in each commodity, linear in commodity money and the other commodity in
the trader’s initial endowment, and have logarithm utility for all other commodities. The
discount factor 3−j guarantees continuity in the product topology. Then, Assumption 4
is satisfied.13 Since vt(x0, xt) =
2
3x0 +
1
2xt, for t = 1, 2, . . . , z
2(x1, . . . , xt−1, xt+1 . . . ) =
3−1 lnx1 +
∑∞
j=3 3
−j lnxj , and zt(x1, . . . , xt−1, xt+1 . . . ) =
∑∞
j=t+1 3
−j lnxj , for each t =
1, 3, 4, . . . , Assumption 5(i) is satisfied. Moreover, as the function vt(x0, xt) is the same
of Example 1, for t = 1, 2, . . . , it follows that Assumptions 5(ii) and 5(iii) are satisfied.
Furthermore, the traders of type 1 and 2 satisfy Assumption 6. In fact, their marginal
utilities of commodity money are bounded, as they are equal to 23 for any commodity
bundle, and ztj(xj) = lnxj is such that limxj→0
∂ztj
∂xj
(xj) =∞, for each j 6= 0, t, for t = 1, 2.
Finally, it is straightforward, though laborious, to verify that the strategies at the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium satisfy the first order conditions associated to the payoff maximisation
problem (5), for t = 1, 2, . . . . Q.E.D.
4. EXISTENCE OF A WALRAS EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we show the existence of a Walras equilibrium for an exchange econ-
omy satisfying Assumptions 1–4. The very first existence result of a Walras equilibrium in
exchange economies with an infinity of commodities was proved by Bewley (1972). Sub-
sequently, Wilson (1981) generalised the existence result to exchange economies with a
double infinity of commodities and traders. Our existence theorem is based on this latter
paper since our exchange economy is a particular case of the one it considers. In fact, his
assumptions on consumption sets, initial endowments, and preferences are more general
than ours. Only the assumption that the economy is irreducible does not have an explicit
counterpart in our paper. However, the fact that all utility functions are strongly monotone
in commodity money and that all traders hold commodity money implies irreducibility.
We first introduce some additional notation and definitions from Wilson (1981). Let Xi
be trader i’s consumption set and %i trader i’s preference relation over Xi. We define an
exchange economy E as a set {Xi,%i, wi}i∈I . For each x ∈ Xi, let P i(x) = {z ∈ Xi : z i x}
and P i−1(x) = {z ∈ Xi : x i z}. In words, P i(x) represents the set of commodity bundles
which trader i strictly prefers to bundle x and P i−1(x) represents those bundles to which x
is strictly preferred. An economy is irreducible if, for any partition of I into two non-empty
subset H1 and H2 and any allocation x, there is a trader i ∈ H1 and a commodity bundle
y, with yj ≤
∑
i∈H2 w
i
j for each j ∈ J , such that y+xi i xi. We now state Wilson (1981)’s
Theorem 2 with the assumptions considered in Section 6.3 of his paper.
Theorem (Wilson’s Existence Theorem) Consider an exchange economy E = {Xi,%i
, wi}i∈I . Suppose that
(I) for each i ∈ I: Xi = `+∞ and the vector of aggregate initial endowments lies in `+∞;
(II) for each i ∈ I and x ∈ Xi: P i(x) and P i−1(x) are both open relative to Xi with
respect to the Mackey topology in `+∞ and if z ∈ P i(x), then λz + (1 − λ)x ∈ P i(x)
for 0 < λ ≤ 1;
(III) for each i ∈ I and x ∈ Xi: if z ∈ P i(x) and y ≥ z, then y ∈ P i(x);
(IV) I is a countable set;
(V)
∑
i∈I w
i
j > 0, for each j ∈ J ;
13Logarithmic functions facilitate computations but are not defined at the boundary. This does not affect
the current analysis but should be kept in mind.
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(VI) the economy E is irreducible and, for any finite set of traders H ⊂ I, there is a finite
set G ⊂ I which contains H, for which the corresponding subeconomy {Xi,%i, wi}i∈G
is irreducible;
(VII) for each i ∈ I: wij > 0 for only a finite number of j.
Then, there exists a Walras equilibrium for E .
Proof: It is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2 in Wilson (1981). As he remarked
in Section 6.3, the result of his Theorem 2 does not change if the commodity space of each
traders is `+∞, preferences are Mackey continuous, and the aggregate initial endowment lies
in `+∞. Q.E.D.
We now state and prove the theorem of existence of a Walras equilibrium in our exchange
economy kE .
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1–4, there exists a Walras equilibrium for kE .
Proof: By Assumptions 1, Xi = `+∞, for each i ∈ I. Since w ∈ `+∞, by Assumption
2, the aggregate initial endowment kw also belongs to `+∞. Hence, (I) is satisfied. Since
utility functions are continuous in the product topology in `+∞, by Assumption 4, they
are also continuous in the Mackey topology in `+∞ (see Bewley (1972), p. 531). Since the
utility functions are concave, by Assumption 4, they are also explicitly quasi-concave (see
Takayama (1974) p. 112). Hence, the preferences underlying the utility functions satisfy (II).
Since the utility functions are monotone, by Assumption 4, the preferences underlying the
utility functions satisfy (III). Since the set of traders I is a countable set, by construction,
(IV) is satisfied. As kwj > 0, by Assumption 3, (V) is satisfied. We now show that (VI) is
satisfied. We first note that all traders hold commodity money, by Assumption 3, and all
utilities are strongly monotone with respect to commodity money, by Assumption 4. Then,
it is immediate to see that for any partition of the set of traders I into two non-empty
subset H1 and H2 and any allocation x, there is a trader i ∈ H1 and a commodity bundle y
with 0 < y0 ≤
∑
i∈H2 w
i
0 and yj = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, such that y+ xi i xi. But then,
the economy E is irreducible. By following the same steps, it is possible to show that any
subeconomy {X,ui(·), wi}i∈G is irreducible with G ⊂ I. Hence, (VI) is satisfied. Finally,
each trader i of type t holds only the commodities 0 and t, by Assumption 3, and then (VII)
is satisfied. Hence, conditions (I)–(VII) of Theorem 2 are satisfied and then there exists a
Walras equilibrium for the exchange economy kE . Q.E.D.
5. CONVERGENCE TO THE WALRAS EQUILIBRIUM
As a Walras equilibrium exists in our framework, we can now state and prove the classical
convergence result to it. More specifically, the next theorem shows that if the number of
traders of each type tends to infinity then the price vector and the allocation, at an interior
active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, converge to the Walras equilibrium of the
underlying exchange economy. Before to formally state this theorem, we need to introduce
some further notation and definitions.
As we need to consider a sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibria for strategic market games
with different k, we write ksˆ to denote a type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
the game kΓ.
14 For each type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium ksˆ we denote by ks˜ a
vector whose elements are the trader types strategies, i.e., ks˜ ∈
∏∞
t=1 S
t and ks˜
t = ksˆ
t, for
14To avoid cumbersome notation, in the previous part of the paper we have not written ksˆ even if the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium belongs to a game kΓ.
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t = 1, 2, . . . . Furthermore, we denote by kp˜ a price vector such that kp˜j = pj(ksˆ), for each
j ∈ J \{0}. Finally, an interior active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium is an active
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium such that
∑
j 6=0,t k bˆ
t
j < w
t
0, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
Theorem 3 Consider a sequence of games {kΓ}k. Suppose that there exists a sequence
of interior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibria, {ksˆ}k, such that the sequences
{ks˜}k and {kp˜}k converge to s˜ and to p˜ respectively. Let hx˜ be an allocation such that
the commodity bundle of the h traders of type t is xt(s˜), for t = 1, 2, . . . . Then, the pair
((1, p˜)), hx˜) is a Walras equilibrium of the exchange economy hE , for any h.15
It is worth noting that Theorem 3 applies to the exchange economy in Example 2 as
each active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium belonging to the sequence {ksˆ}k is
interior and {ks˜}k and {kp˜}k converge to s˜ and to p˜ respectively.
To prove the convergence theorem we first prove a lemma which shows that a strategy
ksˆ
i is also the solution of a maximisation problem where traders choose their best strategies
as if they have no influence on the price vector which is fixed to kp
i. This new maximisation
problem is a key element of the convergent result. Given an active type-symmetric Cournot-
Nash equilibrium ksˆ, the vector kp
i is defined as follows
kp
i
t = pt(ksˆ)
(
1− kqˆ
i
t
k
¯ˆqt
)
and kp
i
j = pj(ksˆ)
(
1 +
k bˆ
i
j
k
¯ˆ
bij
)
, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. (15)
Note that kp
i is a positive vector as the Cournot-Nash equilibrium ksˆ is active. Given the
vector kp
i and a strategy si ∈ Si, the commodity bundle xi(si, kpi) of a trader i of type t
is such that16
xi0(s
i, kp
i) = wi0 −
∑
j 6=0,t
bij + q
i
tkp
i
t,
xit(s
i, kp
i) = wit − qit,
xij(s
i, kp
i) =
bij
kp
i
j
, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
(16)
When prices are fixed at kp
i, the objective function of a trader i becomes ui(xi(si, kp
i)),
for each i ∈ I. We now prove the analogue of Lemma 4 of Dubey and Shubik (1978) for a
setting with infinitely many commodities.
Lemma 4 Given an interior active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium ksˆ of the
game kΓ, the strategy ksˆ
i of a trader i of type t solves the following maximisation problem
max
si
ui(xi(si, kp
i)),
subject to qit ≤ wit, (i)∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0, (ii)
− qit ≤ 0, (iii)
− bij ≤ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, (iv)
(17)
for each i ∈ I, for k ≥ 2.
15The price vector p˜ does not include the price of commodity money. The first element of the price vector
(1, p˜) is the price of commodity money.
16In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by xi(·) both the function xi(s) and the
function xi(si, kp
i).
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Proof: Let ksˆ be an interior active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the
game kΓ. Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t. Following the same steps
used in the proof of Lemma 2, it is possible to show that any si ∈ Si is a regular point of
the constrained set. Since the utility function ui(·) is Fre´chet differentiable, by Assumption
4, and kp
i
j > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, as ksˆ is an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we
have that trader i’s objective function ui(xi(si, kp
i)) is Fre´chet differentiable because it is a
composition of Fre´chet differentiable functions. Therefore, it is immediate to see that all the
hypothesis of the Generalised Kuhn-Tucker Theorem are satisfied and then, if a strategy
si solves the maximization problem, there exist non-negative multipliers λi1, λ
i
2 and µ
i
j , for
each j ∈ J \ {0}, such that
∂ui
∂x0
(xi(si, kp
i))kp
i
t −
∂ui
∂xt
(xi(si, kp
i))− λi1 + µit = 0, (18)
λi1(q
i
t − wit) = 0,
µitq
i
t = 0,
− ∂u
i
∂x0
(xi(si, kp
i)) +
∂ui
∂xj
(xi(si, kp
i))
1
kp
i
j
− λi2 + µij = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t} (19)
λi2
(∑
j 6=0,t
bij − wi0
)
= 0,
µijb
i
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
By the definition of kp
i, it is immediate to verify that equations (8) and (11) become (18)
and (19) respectively. Then, as ksˆ
i, kλˆ
i
1, kλˆ
i
2, and kµˆ
i
j , for each j ∈ J \ {0}, satisfy (8) and
(11), they also satisfy the first order conditions associated to the maximization problem
(17). Since u(·) is concave, by Assumption 4, and the price vector kpi is fixed, it follows
that ui(xi(si, kp
i)) is a concave function. But then, ksˆ
i is optimal for the problem (17), for
each i ∈ I, for k ≥ 2.17 Q.E.D.
We now prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: Consider a sequence of games {kΓ}k. Assume that there exists
a sequence of interior active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria {ksˆ}k such that the
sequences {ks˜}k and {kp˜}k converge to s˜ and to p˜ respectively. Consider, without loss
of generality, a trader i of type t. We first prove that the commodity bundle xi(ksˆ
i, kp
i)
maximises the utility function ui(·) in the budget set Bi(1, kpi).18 First, we show that
xi(ksˆ
i, kp
i) belongs to Bi(1, kp
i). By the equations in (16) and the definition of the budget
set, we obtain
∞∑
j=0
kp
i
jx
i
j(ksˆ
i, kp
i) = 1
(
wi0 −
∑
j 6=0,t
k bˆ
i
j + kqˆ
i
tkp
i
t
)
+ kp
i
t(w
i
t − kqˆit) +
∑
j 6=0,t
kp
i
j
k bˆ
i
j
kp
i
j
= wi0 + kp
i
tw
i
t
But then, xi(ksˆ
i, kp
i) ∈ Bi(1, kpi). We now proceed by contradiction and we suppose that
xi(ksˆ
i, kp
i) is not a maximum point in the budget set. Then, there exists a commodity bun-
dle x′i ∈ Bi(1, kpi) in the neighbourhood of xi(ksˆi, kpi) such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi(ksˆi, kpi)),
17This conclusion can be also obtained by Theorem 2 of Section 8.5 and Lemma 1 of Section 8.7 in
Luenberger (1969).
18The price vector kp
i does not include the price of commodity money. The first element of the price
vector (1, kp
i) is the price of commodity money.
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as ui(·) is concave by Assumption 4. Since ui(·) is also monotone, it follows that x′ij >
xij(ksˆ
i, kp
i), for at least one commodity j ∈ J . As ksˆi is an interior active type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we have that
∑
j 6=0,t k bˆ
i
j < w
i
0 and −kqˆit < 0. But then, as
prices are fixed, there exists a feasible strategy s′i ∈ Si such that xij(s′i, kpi) = x′ij . Hence,
ui(xi(s′i, kpi)) > ui(xi(ksˆi, kpi)). But this contradicts the fact that ksˆi solves the maximiza-
tion problem (17), by Lemma 4. Therefore, the commodity bundle xi(ksˆ
i, kp
i) maximises
u(·) on Bi(1, kpi), for each i ∈ I, for k ≥ 2. In the next step of the proof we show that
limk→∞ xi(ks˜i, kpi) maximises the utility function on the budget set. Consider, without loss
of generality, a trader of type t. We first note that xt(ksˆ
t, kp
t) = xt(ks˜
t, kp
t), by the defini-
tion of ks˜
t. Moreover, limk→∞ ks˜t = s˜t, for t = 1, 2, . . . , by the assumptions of the theorem.
Since pj(ksˆ) ∈ [C,D], for each j ∈ J \ {0}, for any k ≥ 2, by Lemma 3, and kp˜ = p(ksˆ),
by definition, we have that kp˜j ∈ [C,D], for each j ∈ J \ {0}, for any k ≥ 2. Then,
p˜ = limk→∞ kp˜ is such that p˜j ∈ [C,D], for each j ∈ J \ {0}, as the product topology is
the topology of coordinate-wise convergence. Additionally, limk→∞ kpt = p˜ as in equations
(15) the terms in brackets converges to 1 and we can substitute p(ksˆ) with kp˜. These results
imply that limk→∞ xt(ks˜t, kpt) = xt(s˜t, p˜), as the function defined by the equations in (16)
is continuous at s˜t and p˜, where p˜j ∈ [C,D], for each j ∈ J \ {0}. Next, it is immediate to
see that xt(s˜t, p˜) = xt(s˜), by equations (1)–(3) and (16), and that xt(s˜) belongs to Bt(1, p˜).
As the commodity bundle xt(s˜) is a point of continuity for ut(·), we can conclude that xt(s˜)
maximises the utility function on the budget set Bt(1, p˜), for t = 1, 2, . . . . Finally, the price
formation rule guarantees that hx˜ is an allocation, for any h. Hence, ((1, p˜), hx˜) is a Walras
equilibrium for the exchange economy hE , for any h. Q.E.D.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have extended the analysis of noncooperative oligopoly to exchange
economies with a countable infinite number of commodities and trader types. We have done
so by considering the strategic market game, with commodity money and trading posts,
analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978). We have restricted our model to a multilateral
oligopoly setting that was previously studied in Shubik (1973). For this game, we have
proved the existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium and its convergence to the
Walras equilibrium when the number of traders of each type tends to infinity.
Our contribution differs from the one in Dubey and Shubik (1978) because we have
proved the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where all commodities are exchanged
(an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium) while they proved the existence of a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium having positive prices but in which some commodities may not be exchanged (an
equilibrium point). It is easy to see, in the proof of Theorem 1, that only Assumptions 1–5
are required to prove the existence of an equilibrium point in our model. As Assumptions 1–4
are comparable to the ones made by Dubey and Shubik (1978), it is the strong Assumption
5 that characterises the analysis of strategic market games in infinite economies. Such
assumption is key to prove that prices have uniform lower and upper bounds without
using the Uniform Monotonicity Lemma. Furthermore, Assumption 6 is not peculiar to our
model as it is also needed in strategic market games with a finite set of commodities to
prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where all commodities are exchanged.
It is easy to see that the proof of Theorem 1 can be adapted to show the existence of an
active Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the multilateral oligopoly model considered by Shubik
(1973). The existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the Dubey and Shubik
(1978)’s contribution remains an open problem.
From an economic point of view, it is interesting to note that in our framework the
20
relationship between traders’ market shares and traders’ market power is unclear. Given the
price formation rule in the strategic market game and since the set of traders is countable,
all traders will have market power on all commodities, i.e., all traders act strategically.
However, the market share of all traders in Example 2 converges to zero along the sequence
of trading post.19 This phenomenon queries the appropriateness of using traders’ market
share in assessing the level of competition in trading posts. We plan to further study this
issue in future research.
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
In this appendix, we describe the mathematical notions that we have used in the paper.
The definitions and the theorem are based on Luenberger (1969) and the page number in
brackets refers to it.
Definition (`∞ spaces) The space `+∞ consists of non-negative bounded sequences (p.
29).
Definition (Fre´chet differentiable) Let f(·) be a function defined on an open domain E
in a normed space X and having range in a normed space Y . If for fixed x ∈ E and each
h ∈ X there exists f ′(x)h ∈ Y such that
lim
‖h‖→0
‖f(x+ h)− f(x)− f ′(x)h‖
‖h‖ = 0,
then f(·) is said to be Fre´chet differentiable at x, f ′(x)h is said to be the Fre´chet differential
of f(·) at x with incremental h, and f ′(·) is said to be Frechet derivative of f(·) (p. 172).
Definition (Continuously Fre´chet differentiable) If f ′(·) is continuous at the point x0,
we say that the Frechet derivative of f(·) is continuous at x0. If the derivative of f(·) is
continuous on some open sphere E, we say that f(·) is continuously Fre´chet differentiable
on E (p. 175).
Luenberger states the Regular Point definition (p. 248) and the Generalised Kuhn-Tucker
Theorem (p. 249-250) for vector spaces. Since we deal with normed spaces, we state them
for these particular spaces (see Example 1, p.250).
Definition (Regular Point) Let X be a normed vector space and let Z be a normed
vector space with a closed positive cone having non-empty interior. Let g(·) be a function
g : X → Z which is Fre´chet differentiable. A point x∗ ∈ X is said to be a regular point of
the inequality g(x) ≤ 0 if g(x∗) ≤ 0 and there is an h ∈ X such that g(x∗) + g′(x∗) · h < 0.
Theorem (Generalised Kuhn-Tucker Theorem) Let X be a normed vector space and let
Z be a normed vector space with a closed positive cone having non-empty interior. Let
f(·) be a Fre´chet differentiable real-valued function on X and g(·) a Fre´chet differentiable
mapping from X into Z. Suppose x∗ maximises f(·) subject to g(x) ≤ 0 and that x∗ is a
regular point of the inequality g(x) ≤ 0. Then there is a z∗ ≥ 0 such that
f ′(x∗) + z∗g′(x∗) = 0,
z∗ · g(x∗) = 0.
19At the active type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Example 2 there are j−1 trader types active
in a trading post for commodity j ≥ 2 and all of them make the same bid. Then, the market share of a type
t trader on commodity j, bˆtj/
¯ˆ
bj , is equal to
1
(j−1)k , for j ≥ 2. Hence, limj→∞ bˆtj/¯ˆbj = 0, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
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